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Abstract
Variation in the economic well-being among sub-Saharan African countries is among the highest of any region
in the world. This paper attempts to address this disparity by exploring the role of foreign capital inflows. This
project extends the concept of well-being beyond GDP growth, to include measures of poverty and inequality.
A multivariate regression analysis finds that the observed capital inflows have significant effects on all three
measurements of well-being. Findings suggest that the level of affluence of the domestic population has
significant effects on the ability of those populations to translate diaspora remittances into improvements in
well-being.
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 Introduction 
 
Between 2000 and 2010 Africa, as a continent, enjoyed a staggering average 
annual real GDP growth rate of 5.4% a year.1 In contrast, the world average 
annual growth in real GDP for the same period was 3.27%.2 Although this rate 
slowed slightly after 2010, Africa’s growth still remained above the world 
average. However, not all African countries shared equally in this growth. For 
example, while Nigeria boasted an incredible 1125.85% growth in GDP from 
2000 to 2014, Botswana achieved only 180.90%.3 Part of this discrepancy has 
been explained by technicalities in the way GDP is calculated, however there still 
remains vast interstate inequality.4 This massive disparity raises many questions. 
While there is a significant body of research devoted to explaining this inequality, 
relatively limited focus has been placed on understanding the role of diaspora 
remittances in explaining these outcomes. This project will attempt to address this 
gap in the literature by assessing what role remittances have played in sub-
Saharan economies over the last twenty years. Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
and official development assistance (ODA) are included as possible alternative 
explanations for the variation that also represent injections of foreign capital into 
SSA economies.5 
Economic development in sub-Saharan Africa is a topic that has received 
substantial attention in the literature. Some of the predominant theories attempting 
to explain variation in economic growth range from colonialism, and the 
subsequent institutions established, to levels of education and corruption. While 
this project does not dispute the importance of such factors, it asserts that 
workers’ remittances also play a significant role in explaining well-being. To give 
some context, in 2013 remittances sent to developing countries equaled $413 
billion, compared to only $135 billion sent in international development aid.6 This 
                                               
1 Dominic Barton et al. "3 reasons things are looking up for African economies." World Economic 
Forum. May 5, 2016. Accessed December 12, 2017. 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/05/what-s-the-future-of-economic-growth-in-africa/. 
2 GDP growth (annual %)." The World Bank. 2017. Accessed December 12, 2017. 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2010&start=2000. 
3 "World Development Indicators." World Development Indicators | DataBank. 2017. Accessed 
December 11, 2017. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators. 
4 Morten Jerven. "Research Note: Africa by numbers: Reviewing the database approach to 
studying African economies." African Affairs 115, no. 459 (2016): 348. 
5 Muhammad Azam, et Al. "Corruption, workers remittances, Fdi and economic growth in five 
South and South East Asian countries: A panel data approach." Middle East Journal of Scientific 
Research 15, no. 2 (2013): 184. 
6 Dilip Ratha. October 2014. Accessed January 24, 2018. 
https://www.ted.com/talks/dilip_ratha_the_ 
hidden_force_in_global_economics_sending_money_home. 
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 statistic alone shows the importance of understanding the impacts of this capital 
inflow.  
Remittances not only surpass the volume of development aid; there are 
also many other good reasons to believe that they directly influence well-being at 
the household level. The theoretical importance of remittances to household well-
being is supported by findings from research on cash transfer programs.7 One 
recent study from 2018 found that cash transfer programs in Zambia had a 
positive long-term impact on standards of living.8 Remittances are another form 
of cash transfer: putting money into the hands of poorer demographics.  
 This project will provide a brief background of the relevant historical and 
economic context traditionally used to understand economic well-being and 
development in sub-Saharan Africa. I begin with a discussion of the major 
schools of thought which currently dominate the field of international 
development, as well as a few more minor, but nevertheless, significant branches. 
I will then further elaborate on the role that remittance payments have played 
globally, and within Africa, and provide further justification for the assertion that 
such payments are crucial to understanding development in the post-Cold War 
world. This section will conclude with a discussion of the inadequacy of GDP 
alone as a measure of well-being. It will propose additional alternative measures 
which, together with GDP, provide a more holistic and accurate understanding of 
human development.  
 This paper employs a panel series analysis to test the relationship between 
capital flows—including remittances, ODA, and FDI—and three different 
measures of well-being: economic growth, inequality, and poverty. This 
methodology is the most appropriate for identifying the impacts of multiple 
factors on a dependent variable over a significant time period. The analysis 
includes countries in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1995 until 2015.  
 Finally, this paper will conclude with an analysis of the results, as well as 
a discussion of recommendations. The discussion has implications for both 
international and national economic and migration policies. FDI and ODA are 
found to be largely insignificant factors, which suggests a rethinking of many 
current development practices. Remittances on the other hand, are shown to 
positively influence every one of the measures of well-being examined in this 
paper. The migration implications in particular may prove controversial given the 
current resurgence of protectionism and nationalism seen sweeping across the 
globe.  
                                               
7 Lia Fernald C H, Paul J. Gertler, and Lynnette M. Neufeld. "Role of Cash in Conditional Cash 
Transfer Programmes for Child Health, Growth, and Development: An Analysis of Mexicos 
Oportunidades." The Lancet 371, no. 9615 (2008): 828-37. 
8 Handa Sudhanshu et al. "Can Unconditional Cash Transfers Raise Long-term Living Standards? 
Evidence from Zambia." Journal of Development Economics 133 (July 2018): 42-65. 
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 Review of the Literature 
 
There are many competing theories seeking to explain the causes of economic 
success or failure in developing countries. The first school of thought, which is 
particularly relevant to sub-Saharan Africa, emphasizes the experience of 
colonialism on development.9 One central argument in this school is that 
geography led to the creation of different colonial systems, which in turn had 
lasting impacts on the development of the nations that now occupy those same 
locations.10 The next school, the economic institutionalists, asserts the primacy of 
domestic institutions in explaining economic well-being, and is closely linked 
with the colonial school. The argument in this school of thought is that fiscal, 
judiciary, and political institutions, are the primary explanatory factor for 
economic well-being.11 The third major school emphasizes the belief that trade 
and trade barriers explain differential economic growth. The benefits of trade are 
largely based on David Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage.12  
 Some other discussions also consider the role of capital, both natural and 
human. Natural capital has been shown to have both positive and negative effects 
for economic growth due to the volatility in commodities prices that often 
accompanies it.13 In addition to natural capital, human capital, in the form of 
education, is also often cited in explaining growth patterns.14 The most obvious 
way to increase human capital is through education. While the exact impact of 
education on human capital is contested, there is evidence that higher education is 
positively correlated with income growth, specifically among African countries.15 
                                               
9 Daron Acemoglu et al. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical 
Investigation” The American Economic Review 91, no. 5 (2001): 1369-1401. ; Daron Acemoglu et 
al. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income 
Distribution” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 no. 4 (November 2002): 1231-1294. 
10 Acemoglu et al. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical 
Investigation” 1369. 
11 Abdullahi D. Ahmed, and Abu N.m. Wahid. "Financial structure and economic growth link in 
African countries: a panel cointegration analysis." Journal of Economic Studies 38, no. 3 (August 
2011): 331-357. ; Rodrik et al. 135. ; Raju Singh et al. "Determinants and Macroeconomic Impact 
of Remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa." Journal of African Economies 20, no. 2 (October 25, 
2010): 312-340. 
12 Helena Norberg-Hodge. “Sustainable Economies-Local or Global? In The Future of 
Sustainability, 99-115, 2006. 
13Frederick Van Der Ploeg, and Steven Poelhekke. "Volatility and the Natural Resource Curse." 
Oxford Economic Papers 61, no. 4 (2009): 727. 
14 Thorvaldur Gylfason. "Natural resources, education, and economic development." European 
Economic Review 45, no. 4-6 (May 2001): 847-859. ; Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong et al. "Higher 
Education and Economic Growth in Africa." Journal of Development Studies 42, no. 3 (April 
2006): 509-529. ; "World Development Report 1995." World Development Report, 1995. 
15 Gyimah-Brempong, K., et al., 525. 
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  Finally, many have examined how FDI and ODA influence economic 
well-being. Both FDI and ODA represent similar forms of capital inflows, and 
despite a significant body of research showing that aid, on its own, is not 
significant in explaining growth rates, there are still studies which support the 
validity of ODA, and so it is included in the model below.16 FDI, on the other 
hand, has been repeatedly shown to have a statistically significant impact on 
growth, although the magnitude of the impact depends on many domestic and 
international factors.17  
 
The Effects of Colonialism 
 
While the institution of colonialism has long been criticized for its effects on the 
colonized economies, modern understanding of the extent of the significance of 
colonialism on development in Africa began to truly be cemented in 2001 as a 
result of the seminal work of Acemoglu et al.18 Their research used mortality rates 
of European settlers to determine the nature of the institutions created during 
colonialism. They found that areas with high mortality rates for European settlers 
were more likely to experience extractive colonial institutions (a prime example 
being the Belgian colony in Congo), whereas areas with low mortality rates 
experienced constructive institutions (a prime example being the United States ).19 
The reason for this is that in areas with high mortality rates, European settlers 
were unwilling to invest in the establishment of fundamentally sound institutions. 
Instead, they created extractive colonial institutions, which did not guarantee 
protection of private property rights, or governmental checks on power, and were 
designed primarily to transfer wealth out of the colony. Constructive institutions, 
on the other hand, became “Neo-Europes,” which encouraged investment and 
economic growth. Acemoglu et al. argue that the effects of these colonial 
                                               
16 Craig Burnside and David Dollar. "Aid, Policies, and Growth ." American Economic Review 90, 
no. 4 (September 2000): 847-868. ; Henrik Hansen, and Finn Tarp. "Aid and Growth Regression." 
Journal of Development Economics 64, no. 2 (2001): 547-570.  
17Olawumi Awolusi, and Olufemi Adeyeye. "Foreign direct investment and economic growth in 
Africa: A comparative analysis." International Journal of Sustainable Economy 9, no. 3 (2017): 
183-198. ; Muhammad Azam, et Al. "Corruption, workers remittances, Fdi and economic growth 
in five South and South East Asian countries: A panel data approach." Middle East Journal of 
Scientific Research 15, no. 2 (2013): 184-190. ; Eduardo Borensztein et al. "How Does Foreign 
Direct Investment Affect Economic Growth?" Journal of International Economics 45 (May 20, 
1997): 115-135. ; Robert Feenstra and Gordon Hanson. "Foreign Direct Investment and Relative 
Wages: Evidence from Mexico's Maquiladoras." Journal of International Economics 42, no. 3 
(May 1, 1997): 371-393. ;  
Mullins and Mahabir. 243-261. 
18 Acemoglu et al. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical 
Investigation” 1369-1401. 
19Ibid., 1370 
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 institutions continue to be felt in the present, although they are not necessarily 
deterministic.20 Although Rodrik et al. in 2004 criticized this article for not 
sufficiently incorporating the effects of trade into their models, their argument 
remains a largely accepted explanation for differential economic outcomes.21 
 The impact of colonialism has since continued to be explored, and 
scholars within this school have continued to elaborate on the original arguments. 
For example, Acemoglu et al. expanded on their original study a year later, with 
an article arguing that the experience of colonialism effectively reversed the status 
of rich and poor areas that became colonies.22 They use urbanization and 
population data to show that European colonizers were more likely to create 
institutions that encouraged investment in relatively poorer countries, while 
largely extracting the wealth of relatively richer countries.23 The article goes on to 
argue that this reversal in relative wealth, and encouragement of investment 
occurred in the late 18th century just in time for these areas to make full use of 
industrialization.24 Rapid industrialization allowed some countries to expand their 
wealth at unprecedented levels, further expanding the divide between richer and 
poorer countries 
Other significant work on the role of colonialism in development suggests 
links between political affiliations and foreign aid payments, as well as the 
survival of democratic institutions.25 For example, one study finds that an increase 
in time spent as a colony has a strong correlation with the amount of foreign aid 
sent by the colonizing country.26Another study suggests that the survival of 
democracy can be explained by which European empire colonized the country.27 
In summary, this group of scholars focuses primarily on the effects  colonialism 
and how they persist into the present. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
20Ibid.,1395 
21Rodrik et al. 135. 
22Acemoglu et al. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern 
World Income Distribution” 1231-1294. 
23 Ibid., 1231 
24Acemoglu et al. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern 
World Income Distribution” 1256-1259. 
25Alberto Alesina, and David Dollar. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?" Journal of 
Economic Growth 5, no. 1 (March 2000): 33-63. ; Bernhard, et Al. "The Legacy of Western 
Overseas Colonialism on Democratic Survival." International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 1 (March 
2004): 225-250. 
26 Alesina, and Dollar.  45. 
27 Bernhard et al. 247 
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 The Role of Institutions 
 
Many economists agree that domestic institutions play a role in explaining 
variation in growth patterns. Institutionalist economists, however, argue that 
institutions do not simply play a role, but rather are the most significant factor. 
Though Acemoglu et al. would likely consider themselves as belonging to this 
school, I separate them here to emphasize the distinction of colonialism for the 
SSA region specifically. In effect the division becomes a matter of emphasis, with 
colonialism pertaining particularly to the region being studied and thus warranting 
a distinct category. Institutionalists as described in this paper, therefore, represent 
the work of scholars who more generally focus on the role of domestic 
institutions. The seminal work among this group comes from Rodrik et al.’s 2004 
study which examined the role of institutions, trade, and geography on 
development, and ultimately declared that institutions “trump” the other two as an 
primary explanatory factor economic success.28 The core argument in their paper, 
as well as in much of the work of other institutionalists, is that while many 
combinations of factors impact growth—worker productivity, human capital, 
natural resource capital, foreign inflows—institutional quality influences the 
magnitude of these effects. In particular, studies show that the strength of 
financial and banking systems is significant in explaining economic growth 
among African nations.29 One study indicates that the quality of financial 
institutions has an effect on productivity and efficiency, whereas banking systems 
impact growth through their effect on capital accumulation.30 
There are also those who challenge the causal nature of institutions on 
growth.31 An often cited article by Glaeser et al. suggests that human capital is in 
fact a more basic source for growth. From this perspective, countries achieve 
growth as a result of good policies set by autocrats, and only then do these 
countries revise and improve their institutions.32 This idea of the importance of 
policy has also been challenged however, by studies that find that, controlling for 
the effect of institutions, macroeconomic policy such as inflation rate targets and 
deficit spending, had relatively minimal effects on explaining market volatility.33  
 
 
                                               
28 Rodrik, et al. 132-165. 
29 Ahmed, and Wahid. 331-357. 
30 Ibid., 331 
31 Edward Glaeser et al. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?" Journal of Economic Growth 9, no. 3 
(September 2004): 271-303. 
32 Ibid., 271 
33 Acemoglu et al. "Institutional causes, macroeconomic symptoms: Volatility, crises and growth." 
Journal of Monetary Economics 50, no. 1 (January 2003): 49-123. 
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 Impacts of Trade 
 
Trade was long the most often cited explanatory factor for development among 
economists, but support for the trade-led hypothesis has dwindled. The seminal 
piece of scholarship in this school of thought is Frankel and Romer’s 1999 article 
which suggests a large, though only moderately significant, positive correlation 
between trade and income growth.34 This article rejects the notion that the effects 
of trade can be understood through correlation between trade and income because, 
it argues, trade is not determined exogenously. The analysis instead adopts a 
model based on geographic factors on the grounds that these factors are not 
determined by policy or income levels, and they can only affect the wealth of 
individuals by influencing the ways in which those individuals trade with those 
around them.35 In effect, they use geography as an instrument to propagate and 
facilitate trade. Their findings suggest that a 1% increase in trade relative to GDP 
increases income per person by at least one half of a percent.36 
 A similar study conducted in 2018 however, found only a meager 
correlation between bilateral trade openness in Africa and an increase in growth 
after accounting for endogeneity. 37 The one exception is that trade with China has 
been highly beneficial for resource rich countries with predominantly export-
based economies, as well as some non-landlocked countries. Another article from 
2014 which used a Granger causality approach found no evidence for the trade-
led growth hypothesis in a study of 21 African nations.38 
 
Education and Human Capital 
 
There is a constant debate in the world of economics over the impact of 
investment in human capital versus physical capital. One study shows that for 
African nations, an investment in human capital can be as much as three times as 
effective as an investment in physical capital.39 
Although the authors concede that this number is likely higher than the actual 
return on investment vis-à-vis physical capital, it does appear that investment in 
human capital is a worthwhile policy for many sub-Saharan countries. Another 
study also finds investment in human capital to be a significant avenue for growth 
                                               
34 Frankel, Jeffrey A., and David Romer. 379-399. 
35 Ibid, 394. 
36 Frankel and Romer, 381. 
37 Mullings et al. 243. 
38 Kojo Menyah et al. "Financial development, trade openness and economic growth in African 
countries: New insights from a panel causality approach." Economic Modeling 37 (February 
2014): 386-394. 
39 Gyimah-Brempong et al.  526. 
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 among African countries, but only when there exists a sufficient capital stock.40 
This study finds that investment in physical capital is more impactful than in 
education, but only because education is worth the most when it is paired with 
advanced technology. Furthermore, there are researchers who argue that it is the 
quality, rather than the quantity of education that is significant for development.41 
Many in this camp argue that the push to increase the number of children 
attending school has come at the cost of providing quality education; none of the 
economists who believe in the primacy of human capital would argue that poor 
education counts as human capital.  
 
FDI and ODA 
 
Foreign investment is commonly thought of as being beneficial for growth, 
primarily for its ability to provide liquidity, but also for its role in facilitating 
technology transfers. The same article from this year which found only limited 
evidence in support of trade-led growth in Africa, did however, find strong 
evidence that FDI has played an important role.42 The general logic in support of 
FDI as impacting growth is twofold. First, FDI provides access to capital which 
may not otherwise be available, both for small and large businesses in developing 
countries. Second, along with the flow of capital comes the infusion of 
technological advances and technical training that increases the human capital of 
the receiving country, and therefore has a significant effect on growth. An often 
cited study from Borensztein et al. provides evidence that FDI is indeed a source 
of technology transfer, but also that the magnitude of the impact on growth 
depends on the existing stock of human capital within the receiving country.43  
 Other studies suggest that the effectiveness of FDI alone is relatively 
ambiguous, however countries with strong financial institutions seem to benefit 
significantly from FDI.44 
Unfortunately, for many African countries, the lack of strong financial institutions 
may render the effects of FDI negligible, or at least minimal. A 2017 study of 
South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya, and Central African Republic found 
generally limited effectiveness of FDI.45 In countries with slightly more 
developed financial institutions the effects of FDI would likely be higher. For 
                                               
40 Francis Teal. "Higher Education and Economic Development in Africa: A Review of Channels 
and Interactions." Journal of African Economies 20, no. 3 (2011): 51-79. 
41 EA. Hanusake. "Why Quality Matters for Education." Finance and Development 42, no. 2 (June 
2005): 15-19. 
42 Mullings et al. 256. 
43 Borensztein et al. 115. 
44 Laura Alfaro et al. "FDI and economic growth: the role of local financial markets." Journal of 
International Economics 64 (2004): 89-112. 
45 Awolusi, et al. 183-198. 
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 example, over 50% of the rise in the wages of Mexico’s skilled labor force has 
been attributed to FDI and the maquiladoras along their northern border with the 
United States.46 
 
The Case for Remittances 
 
Studies have shown that another form of foreign capital inflows, remittances, are 
negatively correlated with the percentage of the population living in poverty.47 A 
recent report from 2015 examining the impacts of foreign capital inflows suggests 
that remittance inflows, in addition to FDI, may be growth encouraging.48 It is 
from this scholarship, that I assert the importance of remittances in explaining 
variations in economic growth. Although there are some general assumptions 
about the nature and effects of remittances, there is an insufficient understanding 
of the exact impact of remittances on growth rates. Remittances not only surpass 
the volume of development aid; there are also many other good reasons to believe 
that they directly influence household well-being. Remittance payments have 
proven to be countercyclical, meaning that they increase in times of economic 
hardship.49 Other forms of foreign capital inflows, such as FDI for example, are 
much more quick to vanish at the first signs of economic downturn in a country.50 
The stability of remittances enables households in developing economies to act 
according to their long-term interests, such as pursuing higher education, without 
the threat of having their lives reduced to financial turmoil at the first sign of a 
recession. This would suggest that while remittances may have growth-inducing 
qualities, they should also reduce poverty ratings as they provide purchasing 
power to those who may not otherwise have a source of significant income.  
 
Data and Method 
 
This paper employs a multivariate regression analysis of 46 SAA Countries from 
1995-2015. The dependent variables for this project are the three measures of 
economic well-being, GDP growth, inequality and poverty (measured at three 
thresholds), and the independent variables are the three types of capital inflows, 
FDI, ODA and remittances each per capita. The log of the independent variables 
                                               
46Feenstra and Hanson, 371. 
47Richard Adams and John Page. "Do international migration and remittances reduce poverty in 
developing countries?" World Development 33, no. 10 (October 2005): 1645-1669. 
48Muhammad Azam, and L. Gavrilla. "Inward foreign capital flows and economic growth in 
African countries." Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 10, no. 3 (March 1, 2015). 
49 Ratha, Dillip. 2013. The Impact of Remittances on Economic and Poverty Reduction. 
Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. 1 
50 Ibid., 3 
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 was ultimately used in the final regressions in order to reduce the effects of 
outliers skewing results. Inflation and unemployment are two of the main 
macroeconomic indicators which can be influenced by domestic institutions, and 
so they are controlled for. The Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom 
is used to control for the degree of financial and capital market liberalization, 
which is again a measure of domestic institutions, but is also directly related to 
trade. The Freedom House Index is used to control for the level of democratic 
values of a country, which again is pertinent to the institutionalist school. Conflict 
is controlled for simply because the presence of a large interstate or civil war 
would have obvious consequences for well-being. Years of compulsory education 
is also included to account for human capital formation, and natural resource 
rents, which is the surplus value of natural capital minus the cost of extraction, is 
used to control both for natural capital endowments, as well as some of the effects 
of geography. Lastly net trade per capita is also included due to the arguments 
made in the trade school of development. Colonialism is not specifically 
operationalized because its effects should be entirely captured in the other 
measures of macroeconomic well-being described above. The argument of the 
Colonial school is that the experience of colonialism influenced the type of 
institutions which developed, and it is these institutions in turn which affect well-
being. Therefore, once those institutions are controlled for, through variables such 
as the Freedom House and Heritage Foundation indices, colonialism is implicitly 
controlled for as well. Table 1.1 summarizes the operationalized variables, how 
they will be used in the regressions, and the data source used. 
Variable Type Data Source 
GDP Growth (annual %) Dependent World Bank (WDI) 
Gini Dependent World Bank (WDI) 
Poverty ratio  at $5.50 (%) Dependent World Bank (WDI) 
Poverty ratio at $3.20 (%) Dependent World Bank (WDI) 
Poverty ratio at $1.90 (%) Dependent World Bank (WDI) 
FDI (per capita) Independent World Bank (WDI) 
ODA (per capita) Independent World Bank (WDI) 
Remittances Independent World Bank (WDI) 
10
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 15 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol15/iss1/5
 Inflation Control World Bank (WDI) 
Unemployment (%) Control World Bank (WDI) 
Index of Economic Freedom Control Heritage Foundation 
Freedom Index Control Freedom House 
Conflict Control UCDP/Prio 
Compulsory Education Years Control World Bank (WDI) 
Natural Resource Rents (per capita) Control World Bank (WDI) 
Net Trade (per capita) Control World Bank (WDI) 
Table 1.1 Summary of Operationalized Variables 
 
The goal of the analysis is to explain the variation in economic well-being 
among sub-Saharan African countries. It examines the effect of three distinct 
types of capital inflows—FDI, ODA and diaspora remittances—on three major 
components of economic well-being: GDP growth, inequality, and poverty. 
While the literature commonly praises the effectiveness of FDI, recent 
studies have shown that remittances may also be growth encouraging, and that 
they may also be negatively correlated with the percentage of the population 
living in poverty.51 The exact nature of this poverty alleviation has not yet been 
identified however. It follows logically that some level of affluence would seem 
to be necessary in order for migration to occur and thus enable the remittances in 
the first place. Additionally, remittances are a highly regressive form of capital 
transfer, and thus a significant percentage of initial principle is devoted to 
processing fees. The following hypothesis is derived using this logic. 
 
Ha1: Diaspora remittances will be negatively correlated with poverty, and 
that relationship will be stronger when poverty is measured at a higher 
threshold. 
 
Expanding on this assumption that remittance inflows will favor citizens 
who are relatively more affluent, as well as from existing literature which 
suggests that ODA may be conditional upon UN voting patterns as well as a host 
of other issues not related to political institutions or economic policy, the second 
                                               
51 Adams and Page. 1668-1669. 
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 hypothesis is developed below.52 In addition to remittances and ODA, FDI has 
also been shown to be positively correlated with inequality by way of increasing 
labor wages in Mexican Maquiladoras.53 The primary point of consideration is 
that all three forms of capital inflows should only benefit certain demographics, 
leaving the rest of the population relatively worse off. 
 
Ha2: Remittance inflows, ODA and FDI are all positively correlated with 
inequality among Sub-Saharan African countries. 
 
 The last hypothesis stems primarily from the countercyclical nature of 
remittances compared to FDI. As mentioned in the literature review section ODA 
is not generally expected to be a statistically significant predictor of economic 
growth, however FDI has been shown to be growth encouraging. In addition to 
the stabilizing nature of a countercyclical access to liquidity, remittances will also 
be an avenue for populations to finance their education, thus accelerating their 
human capital formation. 
 
Ha3: Diaspora remittances will have a greater impact on GDP growth than 
FDI or ODA. 
 
 This study seeks to identify general relationships between capital inflows 
and three measures of economic well-being in sub-Saharan Africa. To do so, I 
employ a panel series analysis of 47 countries from the years 1995-2015. A 
regression is the most appropriate test for this project as, for each of my three 
hypotheses I have a single dependent variable (poverty, inequality and growth 
respectively), which can be expressed as interval-ratio data. The panel-series 
aspect is necessary because of the repeated observations over time. Given that the 
strength of statistical analysis is improved by the number of cases, and because 
the project seeks to identify patterns across the entire region, as many sub-
Saharan countries as possible are included. The only exceptions are due to data 
constraints. This leaves the project with 46 countries, and data from every year 
since 1995 up until 2015. There are intermittent gaps in the data for some 
indicators, which is certainly not ideal, and may distort the findings to some 
degree, however it does not constitute systematic misrepresentation. Given the 
nature of the Gini index and poverty ratios, many countries only had data for 
these indicators for a few of the years within the sample. Because these indicators 
are slow to change over time, and because they appear to change in a predictably 
linear fashion from the data that is available, the choice was made to interpolate 
data for the missing values. This decision was justified by the fact that it added 
hundreds of cases to the sample, increasing the accuracy of statistical tests 
                                               
52 Alesina and Dollar. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?" Journal of Economic 
Growth 5, no. 1 (1998): 55. 
53 Feenstra and Hanson. 391. 
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 without making unreasonable assumptions about the trends of change in variables 
with missing data. After performing Hausman tests, the only regression which 
met the necessary conditions for a random effects regression was for the Gini. The 
other four regressions were performed with fixed effects. 
The analysis begins in 1995 because it is the earliest year for which data 
for all relevant indicators are available. The year 2015 is the terminal boundary 
because more recent data are not available. Though data for sub-Saharan Africa 
has been criticized for being incomplete and occasionally inaccurate, studies have 
shown that data roughly 18 months removed are more accurate.54 As with any 
statistical analysis, many intricacies will inevitably be lost. However, the goal of 
this project is not to entirely explain why each individual country experiences 
their currently levels of well-being, but rather to identify general patterns across 
the region as a whole.  
 
Analysis 
 
This section will begin with an introduction to the findings. It will then move on 
to a discussion of the results of the regressions as they pertain to the hypotheses, 
and an explanation of the significant findings, as well as the possible 
shortcomings. Next, it will discuss the theoretical implications of the findings, and 
how they are relevant to the research identified in the literature review.  Table 1.2 
shows the descriptive statistics. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP Growth 
(annual %) 
1,170 4.258 8.653 -51.03 149.9 
Gini 1,044 45.36 9.508 21.2 91.7 
Poverty ratio  at 
$5.50 (%) 
1,044 85.04 16.47 6.6 100 
Poverty ratio at 
$3.20 (%) 
1,044 70.2 22.46 2.5 100 
Poverty ratio at 
$1.90 (%) 
1,044 49.24 25.11 0 100 
                                               
54 Jerven, Morten. "Research Note: Africa by numbers: Reviewing the database approach to 
studying African economies." African Affairs 115, no. 459 (2016): 348. doi:10.1093/afraf/adw006. 
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 Inflation 1,086 75.89 1056.43 -35.83 24,411.03 
Unemployment 
(%) 
1,149 9.613 7.61 .3 39.3 
FDI (per capita) 1,215 75.41 296.95 -914 6944 
ODA (per capita) 1,215 78.107 91.13 -14 928 
Remittances 676 9.622 44.63 0 383.59 
Heritage 
Foundation 
Index of 
Economic 
Freedom 
832 53.77 8.002 21.4 77 
Freedom House 
Index 
1,192 0.3355 .4723 0 1 
Conflict 1,121 0.2024 .402 0 1 
Compulsory 
Education Years 
703 7.837 1.848 4 12 
Natural Resource 
Rents (per 
capita) 
1,176 13.32 14.03 0 89.166 
Net Trade (per 
capita) 
952 -100.47 361.72 -2727.409 2287.45 
Table 1.2 Descriptive Statistics for Variables Included in the Analysis of Well-being 
 
 Pertaining to the hypotheses, the results are mixed, as is shown in figure 
1.3, the summary table for all regression coefficients. For Ha1, I fail to reject the 
null hypothesis; while remittances are negatively correlated with poverty at all 
thresholds, that correlation is strongest at the lowest threshold ($1.90), shown in 
Model 3, and diminishes as relative affluence increases (as seen in Models 4 and 
then 5). This is the exact opposite of what I hypothesized. Moreover, all three of 
these results are highly significant. While this result is not what I expected to find 
initially, upon researching the role of cash transfers, the result is consistent with 
previous findings. In general, as cash transfers make up a larger portion of an 
individual's income (i.e. for relatively poorer populations holding the average 
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 amount of remittance transfer constant), they will have a greater effect on well-
being. 
 
 Dependent Variable 
 GDP 
Growth 
Gini Poverty 
ratio at 
$5.50 
Poverty 
ratio at 
$3.20 
Poverty 
ratio at 
$1.90 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Remittances 0.4969* -.02656 -0.7799*** -1.901*** -2.806*** 
FDI 0.1826 0.5924** -.4082 -0.0915 -0.5023 
ODA 0.3942 0.269 0.4802 0.184 0.5636 
Inflation 0.01 0.0869** -0.0143 -0.387 -0.0533 
Unemployment -0.123 0.1593^ 0.5483** 0.7626*** 0.5708* 
Heritage Index -0.2815*** 0.0608 -0.1495* -0.0368 0.204 
Freedom House 
Index 
1.019 1.712** -1.642** -3.047*** -4.670*** 
Conflict -0.2205 -1.310^ -0.2782 -0.3595 -1.433 
Compulsory 
Education 
-4.006^ -0.5260** -0.8893** -0.9885** -0.6378 
Natural 
Resource Rents 
0.0481 -0.0778* -0.0123 -0.0386 -0.1442^ 
Net Trade -0.0002 -0.0018^ -0.0039** -0.0054* -0.0073** 
Note: * ** *** denote significance at the 5% 1% and 0.1% level, respectively. ^ 
denotes significance at the 10% level. 
Table 1.3 Results from Multivariate Panel Analysis Predicting Well-being in Sub-Saharan African 
Countries, 1995-2015 
 
 I also fail to reject the null hypothesis in regards to Ha2. While FDI and 
ODA are correlated with an increase in the Gini coefficient (model 2), both 
migrant remittances are negatively correlated (meaning they reduce inequality). 
However, only the relationship for FDI is statistically significant. While this 
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 possible relationship with FDI and ODA and a rise in inequality may seem 
inherently negative, that is not necessarily true. Economists often refer to what is 
called the Kuznets curve for explaining such trends. The Kuznets curve is a bell-
shaped depiction of the rise and fall in inequality which accompanies quick 
economic growth, and the eventual plateauing that follows. What this graph 
represents is the fact that with periods of economic growth, there will be some 
individuals who are better equipped to maximize their economic gain than others. 
This does not mean, however, that all of the benefits of this economic gain are to 
be had by only a small minority. Essentially, while some certainly benefit more, 
all (or at least most) benefit some. In this way, FDI and ODA, though possibly 
correlated with domestic inequality, do not necessarily lower standards of living, 
and may in fact improve them. This interpretation is challenged by the fact that 
neither FDI nor ODA were shown to be significantly correlated on their own with 
GDP growth. 
 We are able to reject Ha3: diaspora remittances are statistically 
significantly correlated with GDP growth, and this correlation is greater than that 
between FDI or ODA and GDP growth. Moreover, the results for FDI and ODA 
are not even statistically significant, meaning there may not be a relationship at 
all. The primary mechanism through which remittances encourage growth is their 
countercyclical nature. The safety net that the diaspora provides is unique to this 
capital flow, and inherently reduces the negative effects of market volatility to 
which both FDI and ODA are subject to varying degrees. 
The results of this project suggest that diaspora remittances are a much 
more effective form of private capital flow for stimulating economic well-being 
than FDI. Remittances are shown to be strongly negatively correlated with 
poverty, as well as simultaneously positively correlated with GDP growth. FDI 
has a statistically significant relationship with only one variable, domestic 
inequality, and this is a positive correlation. This finding contrasts with the 
literature that has found significant, positive correlations between FDI and GDP 
growth. This is likely a result of poorer quality of institutions for many sub-
Saharan countries, which is a condition upon which many of the benefits of FDI 
are often argued to be dependent. Additionally, ODA was not a significant 
predictor of any of the measurements of economic well-being. This finding is in 
line with the literature, which suggests that ODA is not effective in promoting 
growth or combating poverty.  
 
Conclusion 
 
There are a number of ways in which this paper could be expanded upon by future 
research. One of the more obvious is to illustrate the diminishing marginal returns 
of remittances on poverty alleviation as relative affluence increases. This project 
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 identified the existence and direction of this trend, but makes no claims about the 
size of incremental changes in output of poverty reduction at varying levels. 
Accurately identifying such a measure would allow policymakers to have more 
confidence about the exact effect of changes in policy designed to either increase 
or decrease immigration.   
 Another avenue of future research is the exploration of these findings on a 
country-by- country basis. Variation in the economics of sub-Saharan countries is 
extreme, as the standard deviations for many variables in table 1.2 indicate. This 
means that there are almost certainly countries near the higher or lower 
boundaries of affluence wherein the generalizations made in this paper would 
either not hold true or be even more pronounced. One suggestion for a project 
designed to explore this variation would be the identification of three countries, 
one relative affluent, one relatively poor, and one ‘middle-ground’ country which 
could then be explored in accordance with the same model as developed in this 
paper. This would allow future researchers to have a better idea of how these 
capital flows impact different economies, and thus allow policy makers to more 
informed decisions on a country by country basis.  
 However, when the research is ultimately expanded, it will inevitably have 
implications for migration policy. The results from this paper suggest nothing but 
positive effects on domestic well-being for migrant sender countries. The 
controversy is far more likely to come from the recipient countries of these 
migrants, either due to economic, or simply xenophobic concerns. Therefore, a 
final avenue for future research would be to further examine the impact of the 
economies of recipient countries according to the same measures of economic 
well-being used in this paper.   
A possible policy implication for developing countries would be to 
institute a better framework for diaspora communities to remit. Currently 
remittance payments are a highly regressive form of capital flow, which is largely 
due to insufficient infrastructure being in place to facilitate transfers. This failure 
in infrastructure is reflected in the fact that the African continent is the most 
expensive area in the world to remit to.55 Countries seeking to reduce their 
poverty rates are encouraged to fund public works which support infrastructure 
that enables faster, more reliable transfer of liquidity from diasporas to domestic 
populations. In a sense this recommendation supports an economic institutionalist 
approach in that improvements in domestic institutions is posited to allow 
developing countries to improve their well-being.  
 
 
                                               
55  Dilip Ratha. October 2014. Accessed January 24, 2018. 
https://www.ted.com/talks/dilip_ratha_the_ 
hidden_force_in_global_economics_sending_money_home 
17
Csanadi: Foreign Capital and Economic Well-being in sub-Saharan Africa
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2018
 Works Cited: 
 
Abdullahi D. Ahmed, and Abu N.m. Wahid. "Financial structure and economic growth link in 
African countries: a panel cointegration analysis." Journal of Economic Studies 38, no. 3 (August 
2011): 331-357. 
 
"AGOA Country Eligibility." Agoa.info - African Growth and Opportunity Act. 2017. Accessed 
December 15, 2017. https://agoa.info/about-agoa/country-eligibility.html. 
 
Alberto Alesina, and David Dollar. "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?" Journal of 
Economic Growth 5, no. 1 (March 2000): 33-63. ; Bernhard, et Al. "The Legacy of Western 
Overseas Colonialism on Democratic Survival." International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 1 (March 
2004): 225-250. 
 
Craig Burnside and David Dollar. "Aid, Policies, and Growth ." American Economic Review 90, 
no. 4 (September 2000): 847-868.  
 
Dani Rodrik, et al. "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration 
in Economic Development." Journal of Economic Growth, 2004, 131-165. 
 
Daron Acemoglu et al. "Institutional causes, macroeconomic symptoms: Volatility, crises and 
growth." Journal of Monetary Economics 50, no. 1 (January 2003): 49-123. 
 
Daron Acemoglu et al. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the 
Modern World Income Distribution” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 no. 4 (November 
2002): 1231-1294. 
 
Daron Acemoglu et al. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical 
Investigation” The American Economic Review 91, no. 5 (2001): 1369-1401. 
 
Dominic Barton et al. "3 reasons things are looking up for African economies." World Economic 
Forum. May 5, 2016. Accessed December 12, 2017.  
 
EA. Hanusake. "Why Quality Matters for Education." Finance and Development 42, no. 2 (June 
2005): 15-19. 
 
Eduardo Borensztein et al. "How Does Foreign Direct Investment Affect Economic Growth?" 
Journal of International Economics 45 (May 20, 1997): 115-135. 
 
Edward Glaeser et al. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?" Journal of Economic Growth 9, no. 3 
(September 2004): 271-303. 
 
Fernald, Lia C. H., Paul J. Gertler, and Lynnette M. Neufeld. "Role of Cash in Conditional Cash 
Transfer Programmes for Child Health, Growth, and Development: An Analysis of Mexicos 
Oportunidades." The Lancet 371, no. 9615 (2008): 828-37. 
 
Francis Teal. "Higher Education and Economic Development in Africa: A Review of Channels 
and Interactions." Journal of African Economies 20, no. 3 (2011): 51-79. 
 
18
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 15 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol15/iss1/5
 Frederick Van Der Ploeg, and Steven Poelhekke. "Volatility and the Natural Resource Curse." 
Oxford Economic Papers 61, no. 4 (2009): 727-760. 
 
GDP growth (annual %)." The World Bank. 2017. Accessed December 12, 2017. 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2010&start=2000. 
 
Handa Sudhanshu et al. "Can Unconditional Cash Transfers Raise Long-term Living Standards? 
Evidence from Zambia." Journal of Development Economics 133 (July 2018): 42-65. 
 
Henrik Hansen, and Finn Tarp. "Aid and Growth Regression." Journal of Development Economics 
64, no. 2 (2001): 547-570. 
 
Jeffrey A. Frankel, and David Romer. "Does Trade Cause Growth?" American Economic Review 
89, no. 3 (June 1999): 379-399. 
 
Kojo Menyah et al. "Financial development, trade openness and economic growth in African 
countries: New insights from a panel causality approach." Economic Modeling 37 (February 
2014): 386-394. 
 
Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong et al. "Higher Education and Economic Growth in Africa." Journal 
of Development Studies 42, no. 3 (April 2006): 509-529. 
 
Laura Alfaro et al. "FDI and economic growth: the role of local financial markets." Journal of 
International Economics 64 (2004): 89-112. 
 
Muhammad Azam, and L. Gavrilla. "Inward foreign capital flows and economic growth in African 
countries." Journal of Applied Economic Sciences 10, no. 3 (March 1, 2015). 
 
Muhammad Azam, et Al. "Corruption, workers remittances, Fdi and economic growth in five 
South and South East Asian countries: A panel data approach." Middle East Journal of Scientific 
Research 15, no. 2 (2013): 184-190. 
 
Helena Norberg-Hodge. “Sustainable Economies-Local or Global? In The Future of 
Sustainability, 99-115, 2006. 
 
Olawumi Awolusi, and Olufemi Adeyeye. "Foreign direct investment and economic growth in 
Africa: A comparative analysis." International Journal of Sustainable Economy 9, no. 3 (2017): 
183-198. 
 
Raju Singh et al. "Determinants and Macroeconomic Impact of Remittances in Sub-Saharan 
Africa." Journal of African Economies 20, no. 2 (October 25, 2010): 312-340. 
 
Richard Adams and John Page. "Do international migration and remittances reduce poverty in 
developing countries?" World Development 33, no. 10 (October 2005): 1645-1669. 
 
Robert Mullings and Aruneema Mahabir. "Growth by Destination: The Role of Trade in Africa’s 
Recent Growth Episode." World Development 102 (November 6, 2017): 243-261. 
 
19
Csanadi: Foreign Capital and Economic Well-being in sub-Saharan Africa
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2018
 Robert Feenstra and Gordon Hanson. "Foreign Direct Investment and Relative Wages: Evidence 
from Mexico's Maquiladoras." Journal of International Economics 42, no. 3 (May 1, 1997): 371-
393. 
 
Thorvaldur Gylfason. "Natural resources, education, and economic development." European 
Economic Review 45, no. 4-6 (May 2001): 847-859. 
 
"World Development Indicators." World Development Indicators | DataBank. 2017. Accessed 
December 11, 2017. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-
indicators. 
 
"World Development Report 1995." World Development Report, 1995. 
 
 
20
Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 15 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol15/iss1/5
